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Climate change has been called the defining "human development
challenge[] of the [twenty-first] [c]entury." 1 On the one hand, there is
increasing scientific certainty that anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG) and destruction of sinks has sped up or
forced climate change 2 at such a rate that our technology, our
institutional capacity, and our political will may not be sufficient to
respond to the challenges it will raise. 3 On the other hand, the process
will take place over the course of several decades, and there is still
considerable uncertainty about what the exact impacts of climate
change will be and how quickly they will occur, particularly at the
local level. 4 Policymakers at every level of government are currently
grappling with the prospect of massive changes to our way of life that
will be required both to mitigate climate change through reduction of
emissions and increase of sinks, and to adapt to climate change
through changes to human systems. Such changes must ensure that
we are better prepared to respond to the impacts of climate change
that have, at this point, become either largely inevitable or are already
being experienced.
At the annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in
Copenhagen in December 2009, 5 member states addressed the fate of
two of the UNFCCC's key projects. The first project was agreement
upon a successor to the largely unsuccessful and soon to expire Kyoto
Protocol, 6 which has been the basis of the primary climate change
mitigation regime at the international level. The second was the
negotiation of funding for adaptation to the impacts of climate change
in the developing world, which has the potential to dramatically
I U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting
Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World 31 (2007), available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR 20072008_ENComplete.pdf.
2 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], Summary

for Policy Makers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1, 1-18
(Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007).
3 See generally IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY].

Id.
5 See Official Website of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen COP
15/CMP 5, 7 to 18 December 2009, http://unfcc.int/meetings/cop-15/items/5257.php (last
4

visited Jan. 15, 2010).
6 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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increase resilience to the threats posed by climate change. 7 Sadly,
negotiations broke down at the Copenhagen COP and the Accord8
that was reached by several key parties outside of the U.N. process in
the final hours of the COP may do more harm than good for the
prospects of a full, binding post-2012 agreement. 9
The ongoing negotiations on a post-2012 agreement at the
international level and implementation of international commitments
at the national level include a number of hotly contested issues: (1)
what degree of climate change is acceptable as a basis for emissions
targets, (2) to what extent and in what ways the mitigation regime
should incorporate mitigation approaches in developing countries, (3)
whether the mitigation regime can take advantage of the huge
mitigation potential of changed practices in the land use and
agricultural sectors, (4) how adaptation should be financed and at
what level, and (5) what should be the priorities for adaptation
funding. Health concerns should play a crucial role in the resolution
of all of these issues, but it is by no means certain that they will.
Current and future health impacts of climate change have garnered
some attention in recent years, but global environmental governance
remains grounded in a tradition of natural resources conservation that
has not always been receptive to what it casts as an anthropocentric
view of environmental issues. Although health impacts have played a
role as an important motivation for environmental regulation,'0
environmental governance structures at the national and international
level have largely failed to include health advocates and policymakers
in a coordinated response to environmental health threats. 1 At the
7 See generally UNFCCC, Adaptation Fund, http://unfccc.int/cooperationand-support/
financial_mechanism/adaptation fund/items/3659.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
8 Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, U.N. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, availableat http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/ cop I5/eng/107.pdf (draft decision).
9 Geoffrey Lean, Copenhagen Blame Game is Obstacle to 2010 Climate Deal, GRIST,
Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.grist.org/article/2009-12-29-copenhagen-blame-game-is-obsta
cle-to -201 0-climate-deal/.
'0 See, e.g., Kira Matus et al., Toward Integrated Assessment of Environmental
Change: Air Pollution Health Effects in the USA, 88 CLIMATIC CHANGE 59, 63 (2008).
11William Onzivu, International Environmental Law, the Public's Health, and
Domestic Environmental Governance in Developing Countries, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
597, 660 (2006); cf UNFCCC, Cooperation with International Organizations,
http://unfccc.int/cooperation-and-support/cooperation -with international organizations/
items/2533.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). The UNFCCC website emphasizes that the
UNFCCC has been part of significant efforts to enhance coordination among the three Rio
Conventions, including the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the UNFCCC, all of which are

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 24, 203

same time, global health governance has referred to environmental
concerns mostly in passing, noting the role of climate change, for
example, as one among many transboundary concerns with
implications for global health, 12 but rarely delving into the potential of
environmental policy as a significant opportunity to better meet the
basic survival needs of the world's least healthy people.
The effects of climate change will be experienced in every region,
but will disproportionately affect the world's poorest people. 13 In
addition to creating novel threats to health and shifting the geographic
scope of existing threats, climate change will also act as to amplify
current health crises, dramatically increasing the magnitude of
preexisting problems ranging from poverty, conflict, and hunger to
infectious and chronic disease burdens. 14 In poor countries and in
poor communities within wealthy countries, the effects will be
monumentally more devastating. The world's poorest and least
healthy people also have the least capacity to ameliorate the
potentially devastating effects of climate change.' 5 Climate change,
therefore, not only challenges the international community to find
solutions to reduce the health effects, but also to address the
inevitable questions of environmental justice.
In recent years, health advocates have begun to raise the profile of
health consequences as a major impact of climate change through
promotions such as the World Health Organization's (WHO) World

environmental treaties. Id. It also indicates its appreciation of statements by other
international organizations, including the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the World Bank, the UNDP, UNCCD, the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), and the IPCC, on their efforts to address climate change.
Id. The World Health Organization (WHO) is not mentioned, although its governing
body, the World Health Assembly (WHA), adopted a resolution last year addressing the
human health impacts of climate change, and indicating that the WHO should advise
member states regarding those impacts and work together with the UNFCCC to address
them. See Sixty-First World Health Assembly, Climate Change and Health, at 2, Res.
WHA61.19 (May 24, 2008).
12 See, e.g., Robert M. Pestronk et al., Improving Laws and Legal Authoritiesfor Public
Health Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 47, 47 (Supp. 2008);
Thomas E. Novotny, Global Governance and Public Health Security in the 21st Century,
38 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 19, 29, 34 (2007); William H. Frist, Medicine as a Currencyfor
Peace Through GlobalHealth Diplomacy, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 209, 228 (2007).
13 See generally IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at

393-431 (ch. 8).
14 See id. at 3 58-90 (ch. 7).
15 See id. at 471-506 (ch. 10).
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Health Day' 6 and the American Public Health Association's (APHA)
Public Health Week,17 both of which focused on climate change in
2008. Climate change is expected to act primarily as an intensifier,
and to some extent a redistributor, of existing threats to health.' 8
Direct effects include excess mortality and morbidity due to
exacerbated air pollution, heat waves, hurricanes, floods, wildfires,
and other natural disasters. 19 Devastating natural disasters have
indirect effects on health as well, including increased infectious
disease risk and toxic exposures from contaminated floodwaters or
unsanitary shelter conditions. 20 The mental health impacts of natural
disasters are also considerable.2 1 Climate change also creates fertile
conditions for, and alters the geographic range of, infectious disease
vectors such as insects and rodents; for example, malaria might be
introduced into higher altitudes and dengue fever could be carried
further north.2 2 Increases in food-borne illnesses, which thrive in
warmer conditions, are also anticipated.23 Worldwide, scarcity of
clean, safe water for drinking and sanitation is perhaps the most
concerning anticipated impact of climate change. Water scarcity can

16 See World Health Organization, World Health Day 2008: Protecting Health from
Climate Change, http://www.who.int/world-health-day/previous/2008/en/index.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010).
17See American Public Health Association, Climate Change: Our Health in the
Balance, http://www.nphw.org/nphw08/default.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
18 See infra Part II (discussing health impacts in greater detail).
19See generally Anthony Costello et al., Managing the Health Effects of Climate
Change, 373 LANCET 1693 (2009).
20 See generally J.H. Pardue et al.'
Chemical and MicrobiologicalParametersin New
Orleans FloodwaterFollowingHurricaneKatrina,39 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 8591 (2005).
21 See, e.g., K.L. Middleton et al., NaturalDisasters and PosttraumaticStress Disorder
Symptom Complex: Evidence from the Oklahoma Tornado Outbreak, 9 INT'L J. STRESS
MGMT. 229 (2002); Carmen V. Russoniello et al., Childhood Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder and Efforts to Cope After Hurricane Floyd, 28 BEHAVIORAL MED. 61, 61
(2002); Pierre Verger et al., Assessment of Exposure to a Flood Disaster in a MentalHealth Study, 13 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 436 (2003); Carol S.
North et al., The Course of PTSD, Major Depression, Substance Abuse, and Somatization
After a NaturalDisaster, 192 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 823, 823 (2004); Richard
H. Weisler et al., Mental Health and Recovery in the Gulf Coast After HurricanesKatrina
and Rita, 296 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 585, 585-86 (2006).
22 See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 407 (ch.
8); Kathryn Senior, Climate Change and Infectious Disease: A Dangerous Liaison? 8
LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 92 (2008).

23 See, e.g., R.S. Kovats et al., The Effect of Temperature on Food Poisoning:A TimeSeries Analysis of Salmonellosis in Ten European Countries, 132 EPIDEMIOLOGY &
INFECTION 443, 443 (2004).
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be devastating to human health, especially through its impact on
diarrheal illnesses, which are among the greatest killers of children in
the developing world.24 Ecosystem changes and water scarcity will in
turn impair crop, livestock, and fishery yields, exacerbating what is
already a growing food crisis.25 More remote, but even more
devastating impacts may come in the form of economic instability,
migration, and armed conflict in a time of competition for
increasingly scarce resources.26
Preventive health strategies focusing on the environment range
from household measures such as safe water storage and food
handling practices to energy, transportation, manufacturing,
agriculture, land use, and urban planning policies-all areas that are
relevant to the ongoing debates surrounding climate mitigation and
adaptation approaches. 27 A key lesson of environmental health is that
environmental policy interventions can have significant co-benefits
for health.28 There can also be significant gains for social and
economic well-being, despite the fact that environmental health is
often pitted against economic development considerations in policy
debates.29 Climate policy adds a new layer to complex relationships
between the environment, health, and development.
Thus far,
however, international, national, and even local approaches to climate
change have been largely driven by an environmental policy
community that has its foundation in natural resources conservation.
Unless health policymakers and advocates play a more integral role in
the negotiation and implementation of environmental and climate
policy, they may miss important opportunities to reduce the global
24 See generally A. PROSS-USTUN & C. CORVALAN, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
PREVENTING DISEASE THROUGH HEALTHY ENVIRONMENTS: TOWARDS AN ESTIMATE OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL BURDEN OF DISEASE (2006), available at http://www.who.int/

quantifying-ehimpacts/publications/preventingdisease.pdf.
25 See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES [CSIS], A CALL FOR A
STRATEGIC U.S. APPROACH TO THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS: A REPORT OF THE CSIS TASK
FORCE ON THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS, CORE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2008),

availableat http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080728 food_security.pdf.
26 See id.; see also INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS [IRIN],
RUNNING DRY: THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006),
available at
http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/Running-Dry-IRrN-In-Depth.pdf;
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Climate Change Refugees, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June 2007, at 43.
27 See generally IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE].
28 See generally PROSS-IUSTOrN & CORVALAN, supra note 24; Matus et al., supra note

10.
29

See generally UNDP, supra note 1.
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disease burden through policy interventions that have the greatest
potential for co-benefits for health. The potential for action on both
mitigation and adaptation following the Copenhagen COP in
December 2009 makes this a critical time for health advocacy. As
political momentum in support of strong climate change policy builds,
health advocates must act to ensure that mitigation mechanisms take
potential co-benefits for health fully into account, and that support for
global health infrastructure will be a key part of our international
adaptation response.
This Article argues that emphasis on climate change as a
fundamental transformation of our environment that will have
important consequences for human health has the potential to
motivate and shape consensus on mitigation of climate change, while
also improving our global health infrastructure as an adaptation to
climate change impacts. Part II focuses on the global health burden
currently attributable to environmental causes and the anticipated
health impacts of climate change. Part III provides background on
international climate governance under the UNFCCC and the current
status of negotiations. Part IV sets forth an agenda for the integration
of global health concerns into the negotiation of a series of key issues
currently under debate in the international response to climate change
and the national implementation of international obligations. Part V
offers a conclusion emphasizing the importance of involving global
health policymakers in the response to climate change.
I
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE

In many ways, environmental health has not received
policymakers' attention in proportion to its importance as a source of
global disease burden. The WHO estimates that nearly one-quarter of
the global disease burden, and more than one-third of the disease
burden among children under age fourteen, is attributable to
modifiable environmental factors such as unsafe water for drinking
and sanitation, and air pollution (both indoor and outdoor).30 The
impact of the environment on human health is seen especially in
diarrheal illness, lower respiratory infections, unintentional injuries,

30 See PROSS-OSTUN & CORVALAN, supra note 24, at 9 (measuring disease burden in
terms of disability adjusted life years (DALYs)).
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and malaria. 3' Approximately ninety-four percent of diarrheal illness
worldwide is attributable to modifiable environmental factors, mostly
inadequate access to safe drinking water, unsafe sanitation, and poor
hygiene practices. 32 Approximately forty-two percent of malaria is
attributable to modifiable environmental factors such as land use
policies and practices, deforestation, water management, settlement
siting, and house design.33 In turn, diarrheal illness, lower respiratory
infections, and malaria are among the biggest contributors to the
global burden of disease. 34 The burden of unhealthy environments is
shouldered disproportionately by children, particularly in the
developing world. WHO estimates that more than four million child
deaths each year are attributable to environmental causes, mostly in
the developing world, and that the infant death rate from
environmental causes is twelve times higher in developing countries
than in developed countries.35 If, as Larry Gostin has suggested, one
of the goals of global health law and policy should be to meet the
basic survival needs of the world's least healthy people,3 6 then
environmental health is an excellent starting point. Climate change
acts largely as an intensifier and to some extent a redistributor of
existing threats to health, acting through the same pathways by which
environmental factors are already contributing to global disease
burden.3 7
Perhaps the most high profile health impact of climate change is an
increase in the severity and frequency, as well as a geographical shift,
of extreme weather events. Heat waves are the health threat that is
most intuitively connected to climate change, and discussion of the
climate-health nexus often focuses on recent heat waves in Europe
and North America, which have caused excess mortality measured in
tens of thousands of lives.3 8 Sea level rise has the potential to

31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.

at 10.
11.

34 Id. at
35 Id.

36 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Meeting Basic Survival Needs of the World's Least Healthy
People: Toward a Framework Convention on Global Health, 96 GEO. L.J. 331, 334

(2008).
37 See generally Costello et al., supra note 19.
38 See, e.g., WHO, Climate and Health: Fact Sheet, July 2005, http://www.who.int/
globalchange/news/fsclimandhealth/en/index.html.
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dramatically increase storm surge, 39 which in turn plays an important
role in determining how destructive a particular storm will be. The
geographic distribution of hurricanes and tropical storms will also
40
change, bringing greater frequency of severe storms to some areas.
An increase in the frequency and severity of floods, which are the
most common severe weather. event, is also likely as rising average
temperatures intensify evaporation and precipitation in some areas.41
Out of control wildfires, which are not classified as weather events
but are strongly affected by weather conditions, are also likely to
become more frequent and more severe in some areas.4 2 In addition
to causing direct injuries, extreme weather events also have less
obvious effects on health. Researchers have pointed to the mental
health effects of disasters as a hidden burden on health.4 3 We might
also see increased exposure to infectious pathogens or toxic chemicals
through contaminated floodwaters or unsanitary living conditions
following an event. 4 Natural disasters can also cause a dangerous
disruption in health care for those suffering from chronic diseases like

39 See, e.g., Pardue et al., supra note 20, at 8591; Euripides Euripidou & Virginia
Murray, Public Health Impacts of Floods and Chemical Contamination, 26 J. PUB.
HEALTH 376, 380 (2004); Burkhard Stachel et al., The Elbe Flood in August 2002Organic Contaminants in Sediment Samples Taken After the Flood Event, 40 J. ENVTL.
Sci. & HEALTH 265, 266 (2005); Carlos del Ninno & Matthias Lundberg, Treading Water:
The Long-Term Impact of the 1998 Flood on Nutrition in Bangladesh, 3 ECON. & HUMAN
BIOLOGY 67 (2005).
40 See, e.g., Mike Ahern et al., Global Health Impacts of Floods: Epidemiologic
Evidence, 27 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REvS. 36, 36 (2005); Robert C. Balling Jr. & Randall S.
Cerveny, Compilation and Discussion of Trends in Severe Storms in the United States:
Popular Perception v. Climate Reality, 29 NAT. HAZARDS 103, 107-08 (2003); Kerry
Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30 Years, 436
NATURE 686, 686 (2005); P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number,
Duration,and Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844, 1846 (2005).
41 See, e.g., Axel Bronstert, Floods and Climate Change: Interactions and Impacts, 23
RISK ANALYSIS 545, 555 (2003); K.E. Kunkel, North American Trends in Extreme
Precipitation,29 NAT. HAZARDS 291, 301 (2003); C.A. Senior et al., Predictions of
Extreme Precipitation and Sea-Level Rise Under Climate Change, 360 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON A 1301 (2002).
42 See, e.g., Timothy J. Brown et al., The Impact of Twenty-First Century Climate
Change on Wildland Fire Danger in the Western United States: An Applications
Perspective, 62 CLIMATIC CHANGE 365, 366 (2004); Jeremy S. Fried et al., The Impact of
Climate Change on Wildfire Severity: A Regional Forecastfor Northern California, 64
CLIMATIC CHANGE 169, 170 (2004).
43 Russoniello et al., supra note 21, at 61; Verger et al., supra note 21, at 436; North et
al., supra note 21, at 823; Weisler et al., supra note 21, at 585-86.
44 See, e.g., Pardue et al., supra note 20, at 8591.
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HIV/AIDS, diabetes, or cardiovascular disease, for which regular
medication and treatment is necessary.
Perhaps even more insidious than high-profile extreme weather
events are the more gradually emerging effects on health anticipated
as an impact of climate change. For example, exacerbated air
pollution will have an impact on cardiovascular and respiratory
health.45 Rising temperatures result in higher levels of ground level
ozone pollution (better known as smog), which is formed by chemical
reactions between certain air pollutants, including nitrogen oxides and
volatile organic compounds, 46 and sunlight. 47 While ozone is
beneficial in the upper atmosphere where it provides protection from
UV rays, it becomes a harmful pollutant when it forms at ground
level. Exposure to ground level ozone pollution can cause short-term,
reversible diminished lung function as well as more persistent
inflammation of lung tissue.4 8 ,People who live in areas with high
ozone concentrations are more likely to suffer from respiratory
disease4 9 and have a higher risk of premature death.5 ° Particulate
matter (PM2.5), which includes all airborne particles that are less than
2.5 micrometers in diameter, can be either emitted directly from
sources of pollution or formed through atmospheric reactions, which
are influenced by rising temperatures, among various pollutant
45 See IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 409-12
(ch. 8).
46 Volatile organic compounds (VOCs), including carbon dioxide and methane, are
emitted through the burning of fossil fuels and evaporation from stored fuels, solvents, and
other chemicals, as well as evaporation from vegetation. See, e.g., U.S. Geological
Survey, Volatile Organic Compounds, http://toxics.usgs.gov/definitions/vocs.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010).
47 See, e.g., Susan M. Bernard et al., The PotentialImpacts of Climate Variability and
Change on Air Pollution-RelatedHealth Effects in the United States, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH

PERSP.

199, 202 (Supp. 2 2001).

48 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Folinsbee et al., Pulmonary Function and Symptom Responses

After 6.6-hour Exposure to 0.12 ppm Ozone with Moderate Exercise, 38 J. AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL ASS'N 28, 28 (1988); Robert B. Devlin et al., Exposure of Humans to Ambient
Levels of Ozone for 6.6 Hours Causes Cellular and Biochemical Changes in the Lung, 4
AM. J. RESPIRATORY CELL & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 72, 72-73 (1991).
49 See, e.g., Committee on Environmental Health, American Academy of Pediatrics,
Ambient Air Pollution: Health Hazards to Children, 114 PEDIATRICS 1699, 1700 (2004);
Joel Schwartz, Short Term Fluctuations in Air Pollution and Hospital Admissions of the
Elderly for Respiratory Disease, 50 THORAx 531, 531 (1995); Rob McConnell et al.,
Asthma in Exercising Children Exposed to Ozone: A Cohort Study, 359 LANCET 386, 386

(2002).
50 See, e.g., Michael Jerrett et al., Long-Term Ozone Exposure and Mortality, 360 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1085, 1085 (2009).
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gases. 5' Exposure to air pollution, including PM2.5, has been
associated with respiratory and cardiovascular effects, ranging from
coughing and difficulty breathing, diminished lung function, and
exacerbation of asthma to the development of chronic bronchitis and
increased incidence of heart attack and arrhythmias 2
Researchers also anticipate an increased incidence of zoonotic,
vector-, food-, and water-borne diseases as changing environmental
conditions affect the survival, persistence, habitat range, and
transmission of a variety of pathogens.5 3 Vector-borne infectious
diseases, such as malaria, dengue fever, West Nile virus, and Lyme
disease are those that are spread by blood-feeding arthropods such as
mosquitoes and ticks that carry pathogens from human to human.
Zoonotic diseases, such as Hantavirus carried by rodents -or H5N1
influenza carried by birds, develop in an animal population reservoir
and are spread to humans that come into contact with infected
animals. Both types of illness are affected by the shifting weather
patterns that come with climate change as the habitats and size of
animal populations shift in ways that may bring them into greater
contact with humans.54 The impact of climate change on malaria and

51 See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fine Particle (PM2.5)
Designations, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/pmdesignations/basicinfo.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010).
52 See, e.g., Douglas W. Dockery et al., An Association Between Air Pollution and
Mortality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1753, 1753 (1993); Jonathan M.
Samet et al., Fine ParticulateAir Pollution and Mortality in 20 U.S. Cities, 1987-1994,
343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1742, 1742 (2000); C. Arden Pope, III et al., ParticulateAir
Pollution as a Predictor of Mortality in a Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 151 AM. J.
RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 669, 669 (1995); C. Arden Pope III & Douglas W.
Dockery, Health Effects of Fine ParticulateAir Pollution: Lines that Connect, 56 J. AIR &
WASTE MGMT. ASS'N 709, 709 (2006); Francesca Dominici et al., Fine ParticulateAir
Pollution and Hospital Admission for Cardiovascularand Respiratory Diseases, 295 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1127, 1127 (2006); Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate
Air Pollution and Mortality: Extended Follow-up of the HarvardSix Cities Study, 173 AM.
J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 667, 667 (2006).
53 See, e.g., IPCC, IMPACT, ADAPTATION AND VULNEIZABILITY, supra note 3, at 408
(ch. 8); Senior, supra note 22.
54 See generally D.J. Rogers & S.E. Randolph, Climate Change and Vector-Borne
Diseases, 62 ADVANCES IN PARASITOLOGY 345, 353-54 (2006); P. Gale et al., Predicting
the Impact of Climate Change on Livestock Disease in Great Britain, 162 VETERINARY
REC. 214, 214 (2008); John S. Brownstein et al., A Climate-Based Model Predicts the
Spatial Distribution of the Lyme Disease Vector Ixodes Scapularis in the United States,
111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1152, 1152 (2003); R.S. Kovats et al., Early Effects of
Climate Change: Do They Include Changes in Vector-Borne Disease?, 356 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y LONDON B 1057 (2001); Simon Hales et al., El Niio and
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dengue fever, the vector-borne illnesses with the greatest disease
burden, are particularly concerning.
Increased rainfall and
temperatures have a significant impact on increasing the length of the
transmission season and altering the geographic distribution of vector
55
mosquitoes, both in terms of latitudinal and altitudinal distribution.
Climate change is expected to bring major changes in the risk of
malaria in areas that are at the edges of current geographical
distribution. 56 Food-borne illness is also sensitive to climate change
as higher ambient temperatures allow food-borne pathogens to
thrive.57 Salmonellosis has been shown to be particularly sensitive to
increased temperatures.5 8 Campylobacteriosis, on the other hand, is
less sensitive to changes in temperatures, but is affected by climate
change as a result of its impact on water scarcity, as discussed
below. 59 Higher ocean surface water temperatures also have an
60
impact on food poisoning through the effect of harmful algal blooms
and methylation of mercury 6' on shellfish and reef fish contamination.
' Scarcity of clean, safe water for drinking and sanitation is perhaps
the most concerning anticipated impact of climate change. Water
scarcity can be devastating to human health,6 2 especially due to its
impact on diarrheal illnesses, which are among the greatest killers of
children in the developing world.63 Incidence of water-borne
diseases, such as cholera, cryptosporidiosis, and campylobacteriosis,
is expected to rise as a result of climate change due to droughts,
which concentrate pathogens in pools, and floods, which increase
the Dynamics of Vectorborne Disease Transmission, 107 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 99
(1999).
55 See ICCP, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 407 (ch.

8).

56 Id.

57 See, e.g., Kovats et al., supra note 23, at 443.
58 Id.

59 See, e.g., R. Sari Kovats et al., Climate Variability and Campylobacter Infection: An
InternationalStudy, 49 INT'L. J. BIOMETEOROLOGY 207, 210 (2004).
60 IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 400 (ch. 8).
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., CORRINE J. SCHUSTER-WALLACE ET AL., SAFE WATER AS THE KEY TO

GLOBAL HEALTH
(2008), available at http://www.inweh.unu.edu/Health/docs/
2008PolicyBrief.pdf; Bettina Menne & Roberto Bertollini, The Health Impacts of
Desertification and Drought, DOWN TO EARTH (Convention to Combat Desertification,
Bonn, F.R.G.), Dec. 2000, at 4.
63 See PROSS-OSTON & CORVALAN, supra note 24, at 9 (measuring disease burden in
terms of DALYs).
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runoff and microbial contamination of water supplies.6 4 Waterwashed diseases, illnesses for which the main transmission pathway is
not through contaminated water, but which are affected by hygiene
practices and thus sensitive to water scarcity such as rotavirus, are
also expected to be significantly affected by climate change.65
Over a longer time horizon, we may see even more serious threats
to health due to major changes in human settlements and increasing
armed conflict as a result of climate change and sea level rise. 66 We
could see widespread food and water insecurity on an unprecedented
scale as the global food and water crises that are already occurring as
a result of population growth, environmental degradation, and
economic factors 67 are exacerbated by climate change. The mutually
reinforcing trends of climate change and environmental degradation
are "likely to make many parts of the world uninhabitable, or at least
uneconomic," potentially resulting in mass migration both within and
across national borders.68
II
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

A. InternationalCooperationfor Climate Change Mitigation and
Adaptation
In 1992, most nations of the world including the United States
signed the UNFCCC, which went into effect in 1994.69 As a
framework convention, the UNFCCC did not itself create significant
legally binding obligations. Rather, it set forth the broad goal of
stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the global climate
system within a time frame that would allow for natural adaptation of
ecosystems to climate change, protection of food production, and
sustainable economic development.7 °
The UNFCCC's climate

64 IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at 401 (ch. 8).
65 Id. at 400 (ch. 8).
66 See, e.g., LESTER R. BROWN, PLAN B 3.0: MOBILIZING TO SAVE CIVILIZATION

(2008).
67 See CSIS, supra note 25; see also IRIN, supra note 26.
68 Sachs, supra note 26, at 43.
69 See UNFCCC, Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/essential-background/
convention/status of ratification/items/263 1.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
70 UNFCCC art. 2, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
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change mitigation policy is directed primarily at industrialized
countries, and its original goal was to stabilize those countries' GHG
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. As of 2009, 192 countries
had ratified the UNFCCC.7 1
In 1997, following particularly tense negotiations at the Kyoto
COP to the UNFCCC, the parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which
went into force in 2005.72 In the agreement that was eventually
hashed out despite considerable discord between the U.S. and EU
delegations, thirty-seven developed countries and the European
community, listed in Annex 1, agreed to reduce their emissions of
GHGs to at least five percent below 1990 levels by 2012. 73
Developing countries were not committed to binding targets, though
they had the option of establishing voluntary targets.74 In addition to
emissions reduction targets, the agreement established a system of
emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean development
mechanisms to encourage cooperation between developed and
developing countries to reduce emissions. Although the United States
signed the Protocol, it is the only major developed country that has
not ratified it. In 1997, the U.S. Senate passed a unanimous
resolution stating that the United States should not be a signatory to
any protocol that did not include binding emissions reduction targets
for developing as well as developed countries.7 5 The Clinton
administration never sent the Protocol to the Senate for ratification,
and the Bush administration openly opposed ratification, arguing that
China and India were not bound to emissions reduction targets, and
that participation in such a regime would unjustifiably disadvantage
76
the U.S. economy against these emerging competitors.
B. Negotiation of a Successor to the Kyoto Protocol
Because the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and
because virtually all of the countries that did ratify have thus far fallen
71 See

UNFCCC,

Convention,

http://unfccc.int/essential-background/convention/

items/2627.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
72 See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6.
73 Id.
74 Id.

75 See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
76 See, e.g., Tony Karon, When it Comes to Kyoto, the US. is the "Rogue Nation,"
TIME, July 24, 2001, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,168701,00.html;
Bush Faces Up to Kyoto Critics, BBC NEWS, June 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/1382564.stm.
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far short of meeting their obligations under it,7 7 the Kyoto Protocol
has been widely regarded as a failure.78 In any case, the commitments
contained in the Kyoto Protocol expire in 2012 and the UNFCCC
member states began to sketch out what a successor GHG emissions
reduction regime might look like, and to establish milestones to stay
on track for negotiation of a successor protocol. At the 2007 COP in
Bali, the United States joined other nations in agreeing to negotiate a
successor protocol by the end of 2009 as part of the Bali Action
Plan. 79 Although a change in the U.S. presidential administration may
make U.S. participation in the Kyoto successor regime possible, any
agreement would still have to be ratified by two-thirds of the U.S.
Senate. Unfortunately, ratification by such a majority is unlikely
unless emerging economies that are important competitors for the
United States are bound to emissions reduction targets. Draft
agreements were presented by the chair and discussed .bythe parties
during negotiation sessions in Bonn, Germany, in June and August of
2009.0 Ultimately, however, much of the substance of the new
mitigation regime was left unsettled leading up to the December 2009
COP in Copenhagen. 81 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

77 Environment: Callfor Agreement to Replace Kyoto Protocol, KEESING'S WORLD
Aug. 28,
2009, http://www.keesings.com/breaking-history/
NEWS ARCHIVES,
international/environment call-for agreement to replace-kyoto..protocolpub.aug._28,
_2009/environment call foragreementjtoreplace.kyoto.protocol-'full text.
78 See, e.g., Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, Time to Ditch Kyoto, 449 NATURE 973
(2007); Patrick J. Michaels, Lessons of Kyoto, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NzYwMjZkNDQwNjczOGUyMTBhZWVhMjRjNjF
1MDVhNDg. In the lead-up to the Copenhagen COP, some commentators sought to dispel
the generally accepted notion that Kyoto was an abject failure, presumably in an effort to
combat popular perception that emissions reductions would not be ensured even if parties
were successful in their efforts to negotiation binding limits at the COP. See, e.g., Bill
Chameides, Did the Kyoto ProtocolMiss the Target? HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 2009,
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/bill-chameides/did-the -kyoto-protocol-mi b 317855.html
(arguing that it is too early to declare Kyoto a failure and that "[iun all likelihood when
2012 rolls around, we will find that overall its Annex B countries will have cut emissions
by more than the intended 5.2 percent").
79 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Bali Action Plan, Dec. 1/CP.13, in Report on
Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1
(Mar. 14, 2008).
80 See UNFCCC, Bonn Climate Change Talks-June 2009, http://unfccc.int/meetings/
sb30/items/4842.php;
UNFCCC, Bonn Climate Change Talks-August 2009,
http://unfccc.int/meetings/intersessional/bonn_09_2/items/4913.php.
81 Sven Harmeling & Christoph Bals, Political Will at the Highest Level Needed: A
Hesitant Beginning to the "Countdown to Copenhagen" at the Climate Negotiations in
Bonn, June 2009, GERMANWATCH, http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/sb30rese.pdf (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010).
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Change (IPCC) had recommended that in the Copenhagen agreement
industrialized countries must commit to reducing their emissions by
twenty-five to forty percent compared to 1990 levels by 2020 to
82
remain close to a two degrees Celsius rise in average temperatures.
Early on, it became apparent that such a commitment was unlikely.
At the 2008 COP in Poznan, the European Union, Norway, and
Switzerland were among the only parties who
expressed some
3
willingness to seriously negotiate on this point.8
Ultimately, the 2009 COP utterly failed to achieve a full, U.N.based agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. Two weeks of
negotiations were plagued by delays and seemingly insoluble
disagreements. Then, at the last minute the United States and China,
joined by key rapidly industrializing countries India, Brazil, and
South Africa, attempted to salvage the COP with the Copenhagen
Accord. The agreement includes a relatively vague commitment to
work towards curbing global temperature rise to below two degrees
Celsius. 8 4 The Accord is voluntary and postpones setting binding
targets, but it does bring together key parties that are not subject to
emissions reduction under Kyoto. 85 Interestingly, the Accord was
negotiated outside of the UNFCCC process and was noted, but not
adopted by the UNFCCC member states at the close of the
Copenhagen COP. 86 How the Accord and the failure at Copenhagen
will affect future efforts to negotiate a full post-2012 agreement is at
this point unclear.87
Many commentators have noted that
Copenhagen and the lead-up to it revealed serious flaws in the U.N.
82 IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27, at 776.
83 CHRISTOPH BALS, BETWEEN POZNAN AND COPENHAGEN: THE CLIMATE TRAIN IN

THE "VALLEY OF DEATH" 4 (2009), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/ldima/
cl 4rese.pdf.
84 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 8.
85 U.S., China Step Forward in Climate Debate (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 24, 2009),
http://weblogs.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyld= 121846177.
86 Press Release, Friends of the Earth, UN Climate Conference Closes Without
Adopting 'Copenhagen Accord' (Dec. 19, 2009), available at http://www.foe.org/un
-climate-conference-closes-without-adopting-copenhagen-accord;
Summary
of the
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS
BULL. (Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 22, 2009, at 1-2, available
at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12459e.pdf ("During informal negotiations
facilitated by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon during the night and early morning,
parties agreed to adopt a COP decision whereby the COP 'takes note' of the Copenhagen
Accord, which was attached to the decision as an unofficial document.").
87 See, e.g., Lean, supra note 9 (summarizing various positions laying blame for the
failure at Copenhagen).
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negotiating regime, which could continue to stymie efforts in 2010
and beyond if they are not addressed.8 8
C. The Adaptation Regime
Whereas mitigation efforts seek to avoid harmful anthropogenic
climate change, or at least reduce its extent, adaptation efforts seek to
reduce the vulnerability of human settlements to the impacts of
climate change. Adaptation measures seek to build "ecological and
social community resilience to climate change., 89 Ecological
resiliency includes "protecting and preserving the natural ecosystems
that help human communities survive through buffering from floods,
filtering drinking water, stabilizing soil, providing sustainable forest
products, and preserving a host of other ecosystem services necessary
for human survival." 90 In the context of climate governance under the
UNFCCC, ecological resiliency is not pursued for the purpose of
"preserving functioning ecosystems and their myriad component
species for their own sake," 9 1 though that is a purpose of other
international environmental agreements such as the Convention on
Biological Diversity. 92 Social resiliency includes "forging the
democratic capacity to help marginalized communities accrue the
administrative, technical, and political power that will help them
make difficult decisions and survive the coming vicissitudes of nature
and the coming economic and political upheavals . . . that are now
befalling and will continue to befall them., 93 More specific to the
concerns of global health law, adaptation of human systems includes
the building of capacity, including through law and policy reform, to
face the anticipated health impacts of climate change.

88 See, e.g., Joe Churcher, Gordon Brown: Small Number of Countries Held
Copenhagen Talks to Ransom, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 21, 2009. U.N. Secretary General Ban

Ki-Moon has called for investigation of potential reforms to the U.N. negotiations process.
See United Action on Global Scale Needed to Cinch New Climate Pact, Says Ban, UN
NEWS CENTRE, Dec. 21, 2009, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story
.asp?NewslD=33311 &Cr--copenhagen&Crl =.
89 David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change
Adaptation, and InternationalLaw, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 43

(2009).
90 Id. at 44.
91 Id.

92 Convention on Biological Diversity art. 1,June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
93 Takacs, supra note 89, at 44.

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 24, 203

Article 2 of the UNFCCC sets a goal of stabilizing atmospheric
GHG emissions at a level that would "allow ecosystems to adapt
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner. ' 9 4 Since it has become increasingly clear that
mitigating climate change is unlikely to be achieved, at least to the
point where natural adaptation is possible, attention has shifted to
planned adaptation of human systems. The concept of planned
adaptation of human systems to climate change has always been a
part of the UNFCCC. For example, Article 4.4 of the UNFCCC
requires that developed countries "shall also assist the developing
country [p]arties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects
of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse
effects., 95 Until relatively recently, however, adaptation has taken a
backseat to mitigation efforts.
Focus on adaptation has been somewhat controversial within the
environmental advocacy and climate science communities because
some fear that it will reduce the impetus for mitigation efforts by
admitting that mitigation efforts are unlikely to reduce anthropogenic
climate change at a fast enough rate to prevent significant impacts,
and by casting those impacts as manageable through technological
and social advances. 96 On the other hand, by "shift[ing] the question
from whether impacts from climate change will occur in the near
term, and whether some portion will be unacceptable, to the hows of
97
achieving some control over the more dire consequences expected,,
the adaptation question has in some ways moved the climate
community forward, and has created the opportunity for greater
engagement of scientific, advocacy, and policy communities in other
fields, including agriculture and global health. Additionally, the focus
on adaptation, by making the discussion of climate change impacts
more concrete, is also more amenable to the framing of climate
change as an environmental justice issue. Research on projected
impacts, and on the likely vulnerability and adaptation capacity of
94 UNFCCC, supra note 70, at art. 2.
95 Id. at art. 4.4.
96 See, e.g., Mark Hertsgaard, On the Front Lines of Climate Change, TIME, Apr. 9,
2007, at 102; Rick Salutin, Adaptation Equals Doing Nothing, RABBLE.CA, Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.rabble.ca/columnists/adaptation-equals-doing-nothing.
97 Preface to INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH WITH ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE

CHANGE: LESSONS LEARNED AND NEW DIRECTIONs, at xviii (Kristie L. Ebi et al. eds.,

2005).
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various regions, highlights the fact that climate change is largely
driven by industrialized nations.98 Yet, the adverse impacts of climate
change will be felt first and foremost by those in developing nations
who have the least capacity to adapt to such impacts. 99
In 2006, at the Nairobi COP, member states negotiated the
establishment of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the Nairobi
Work Program on Adaptation. 00 The Fund is generated by a two
percent tax levied on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
projects, which are emissions offset projects undertaken by
industrialized countries, primarily by way of private enterprises in the
developing world. 01' This innovative funding mechanism has the
potential to create an adaptation budget that could be as much as five
times the budgets of the two previously created climate change funds,
which relied on direct "funding from donor countries. 0 2 The
Adaptation Fund is expected to generate between $160 and $950
million per year between now and 2012, the year the Kyoto Protocol
expires. 1 3 The Fund is dedicated to enabling concrete adaptation
activities, and experts are anticipating a frenzy of proposals seeking a
piece of the pie.

98 See Costello et al., supra note 19, at 1712.
99 See id.
100 Benito Miiller, The Nairobi Climate Change Conference: A Breakthrough for
Adaptation Funding, OXFORD ENERGY & ENV'T COMMENT, Jan. 2007, at 1, availableat
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0107-1 .pdf.
101 The CDM has a somewhat controversial past. It grew out of a proposal by Brazil,
with the support of the G-77 nations, as a means to compel Annex 1 countries to meet their
emissions reduction targets by requiring a fine for emissions in excess of their targeted
limits. Takacs, supra note 89, at 53-54. The fines would then be used to fund mitigation
and adaptation projects in developing countries. Id. Eventually, however, the program
morphed into a mechanism for allowing industrialized countries, and more specifically
private actors within them, to avoid real emissions reductions while making a profit at the
same time. Id. Private enterprises can use CDM projects in developing countries,
primarily China, Brazil, Mexico, and India, which have the infrastructure to meet the
bureaucratic and technical requirements imposed by the CDM to offset requirements
imposed on them by their respective governments. Id. They can also profit by selling or
trading credits in an emissions trading regime. Id.
Much, if not most of the U.N.-sponsored effort in the past ten years around climate
change has gone into making a functional CDM, much to the benefit of business
interests around the world. Private actors generated $US30 billion per year worth
of CDM projects in 2006, the first year after the Kyoto Protocol went into effect.
Id. at 54.
102 Miuller, supranote 100, at 2.
103 Id.
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The Adaptation Fund Board has indicated that it wishes to
implement "[a]daptation activities where sufficient information is
available to warrant such activities, inter alia, in the areas of: (i) water
resources management, (ii) land management, (iii) agriculture, (iv)
health, (v) infrastructure development, (vi) fragile ecosystems,
including mountainous ecosystems, and (vii) integrated coastal zone
management." 10 4 Because the United States has not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol, it does not currently have any direct means of influencing
decisions with respect to the Adaptation Fund. Instead, the European
Union has taken on a leadership role. Significant progress was made
in 2008 and 2009 on readying the Adaptation Fund for
implementation. The basic structure of the fund was established, and
the groundwork was laid for a large-scale finance architecture to be
negotiated in Copenhagen. 10 5 Much to the chagrin of developing
countries, however, industrialized countries expressed considerable
reluctance toward increasing the 10funding
through a variety of
6
mechanisms that have been proposed.
Financing of adaptation in developing countries is intimately
17
linked to the potential success of a post-2012 mitigation regime. 0
Developing countries at the Bali COP in 2007 expressed that their
willingness to participate in the mitigation regime hinged on the
scaling up of funding for adaptation. 0 8
Indeed, funding for
adaptation in developing countries was a major focus of negotiations
at the Copenhagen COP.10 9 Ultimately, in the Copenhagen Accord,
developed countries committed to a short-term financing goal of
approximately $80 billion for the period from 2010 to 2012, with a
balance between mitigation and adaptation, and a long-term goal of
104 Adaptation Fund Board, Draft Provisional OperationalPolicies and Guidelinesfor
Partiesto Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund, at 7, AFB/B3.8 (Aug. 26, 2008),
available at http://www.adaptation-fund.org/images/AFB.B.3.8-OperationalPoliciesand
_Guidelines_08.26.08-_revised. I .pdf.
105 See Sven Harmeling & Alpha Kaloga, Adaptation Fund: CriticalProgressat the 7th
Meeting, GERMANWATCH, Sept. 2009, available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/

afb2009-09r.pdf.
106 SVEN HARMELING, ADAPTATION UNDER THE UNFCCC-THE ROAD FROM BONN

TO POZNAN 2008, at 6 (2008), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/klima/
bonnadapt08e.pdf.
107 See Eric J. Lyman, Kyoto: PowerShift in the Making, ISN SECURITY WATCH, June
19, 2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detaili?id=102025&
Ing=en.
108 BALS, supra note 83, at 4.
109 See Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December
2009, supra note 86, at 3.
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$100 billion by 2020 "to address the needs of developing
countries."' 10 At this point, it is not clear how much of this funding
will be committed to adaptation or whether any of it will flow through
the UNFCC Adaptation Fund."'1
Although recent developments indicate significant progress on the
development of an adaptation regime under the UNFCCC, adaptation
in the developing countries that are at greatest risk of catastrophic
climate impacts suffers from an implementation gap,' 12 as funds have
not been provided and the infrastructure required to make use of
adaptation funding is not in place in the poorest countries." 3 One of
the great ironies of climate change adaptation is that countries that are
likely to see the least severe impacts from climate change have spent
monumentally more on adaptation within their borders than they have
donated to adaptation in the poorest countries, where far more
significant impacts will be felt. 114 While developed nations are
currently spending about $40 million per year to fund adaptation in
developing countries, they are spending about $40 billion per year on
their own adaptation projects.' 15
III
THE ROLE OF HEALTH ADVOCACY IN THE NEGOTIATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF A POST-2012 FRAMEWORK

A. Putting a Human Face on Climate Change
Policymakers, advocates, and scholars alike have noted that putting
a human face on climate change could be the key to generating the
massive amount of political will that will be required to effectively
respond to climate change. Roberto Bertolini of the WHO says that
110 United States Climate Action Network, Understanding the Copenhagen Accord,
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/understanding-the-copenhagen-accord
(last
visited Feb. 4, 2010).
III ALPHA KALOGA & SVEN HARMELING, THE ADAPTATION FUND IN COPENHAGEN:

SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.germanwatch.org/
klima/afb2009-12.pdf.
112 Id.

113 Takacs, supra note 89, at 53 (stating that eighty percent of CDM projects, which
develop mitigation and adaptation capacity in the developing world, are in Brazil, China,
Mexico, and India, where infrastructure is advanced enough to meet the bureaucratic and
technical requirements imposed by the CDM).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
115 Takacs, supra note 89, at 56 (citing Andrew C. Revkin, PoorNations to Bear Brunt
as World Warms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2007, at Al).
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he hopes that climate change will bring to mind the image of a
malnourished child in Africa dying of diarrheal illness rather than the
image of a drowning polar bear."1 6 Lisa Heinzerling, a legal scholar
who was recently named Senior Climate Counselor to the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, has argued
that the characterization of climate change as "knowing killing" of
people in the developing world creates a moral obligation on the part
of industrialized countries to respond.' 17 At the opening session of
the Copenhagen COP, Algeria spoke for African member states
highlighting the fact that "Africans are already impacted by climate
change through increased droughts, health hazards, food scarcity and
18
migration."'
But beyond these broad strokes and general references to the
connection between climate change and global health, what are the
concrete opportunities for health advocates to influence the
international response to this emerging threat? As a good starting
point, putting a human face on climate change has an important role
to play in reaching an agreement on a limit beyond which the extent
of climate change becomes unacceptable. As discussed above, the
objective of the UNFCCC is the "stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
'' 19
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."
What that level is and what the timeframe should be is still a matter of
debate.
The goal that gained consensus in negotiations leading up to
Copenhagen, but agreement upon which is still far from certain, is to
limit global warming to a global mean surface temperature rise of two
degrees Celsius. In the months leading up to Copenhagen, a growing
number of parties began calling for an even stricter limit of 1.5
degrees Celsius, based on concerns that the impacts even at a two
degrees Celsius increase are unacceptable.1 20 The European Union,
Norway, Iceland, African nations, and Chile joined the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS) in campaigning for this stricter limit, and
116 Conversation with Roberto Bertolini, Dir., Special Programme on Health & Env't,
World Health Org. (Jan. 21, 2009).
117 Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change. Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary
Principle,96 GEO. L.J. 445, 460 (2008).
118 See Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December
2009, supra note 86, at 3.
119 UNFCCC, supra note 70, at art. 2.
120 See BALS, supra note 83, at 6.
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other developing countries indicated that they may join the effort as
well. 2 ' IPCC Chairman Rajendra Pachauri stated that the two
degrees Celsius limit may not be ambitious enough, and activist Al
Gore publicly called for a 1.5 degrees Celsius limit. 22 The
Copenhagen Accord commits parties to a two degrees Celsius limit,
but also includes ambiguous language
regarding further investigation
23
of a 1.5 degrees Celsius limit.
Even to limit global warming to an increase of two degrees
Celsius, the IPCC has recommended that GHG emissions must be
reduced by twenty-five to forty percent of 1990 levels by 2020.124 By
way of comparison, in the fall of 2009 the Obama administration
indicated a willingness to cut emissions to 1990 levels, the so called
"zero percent target," by 2020.125 The Kyoto Protocol commits thirtyseven industrialized countries and the European Union to reducing
emissions to five percent below 1990 levels by 2012, and parties have
failed to meet even those modest targets.126 The European Union
recently indicated willingness to commit to a thirty percent reduction
below 1990 levels by 2020, contingent upon an agreement by other
nations to do the same. 27 Although this was the most ambitious
target announced by any industrialized country, experts believe that
even a reduction of this scale may not8 be sufficient to limit global
2
warming to under two degrees Celsius.
The campaign for consideration of a 1.5 degrees Celsius pathway
has been driven in large part by arguments regarding sovereignty and
the claim that no nation's survival is negotiable. 29 In addition to
considering whether some small island states would cease to exist
altogether under the two degrees Celsius scenario, however,
121 Id.

Id.
123 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 8,
12 ("We call for an assessment of the
implementation of this Accord to be completed by 2015, including in light of the
Convention's ultimate objective. This would include consideration of strengthening the
long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation
to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.").
124 BALS, supra note 83, at 4.
125 See John Heilprin, Obama on Climate Change: U.S. 'Determined to Act,'
HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/22/un-cli
mate-summit-puts-ch_n_294409.html.
126 Environment: Callfor Agreement to Replace Kyoto Protocol, supra note 77.
127 See BALS, supra note 83, at 9.
122

128

Id,

129 Id.
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policymakers should highlight the considerable difference in impacts,
particularly health impacts, that might be seen between the two paths.
The two degrees Celsius limit appears to be the point at which sea
level rise would be severe enough that millions more people would
experience coastal flooding,1 30 though increasingly scientists believe
that point may be reached at the 1.5 degrees Celsius mark. Most of
the health impacts described above begin at the 0.5 degrees Celsius
point, however, and some of them are already in evidence today.
Localized impacts on food security are currently in evidence, but
experts believe that decreases in crop yields will become widespread
by the one degree Celsius point, and will reach critical levels by 3.5
degrees Celsius.13 1 Water stress is increased at an extremely low
threshold and worsens
rapidly with increasing
average
temperatures. 32 More research is needed to assess the relationship
between the severity of health impacts and increasing average
temperatures, but the argument here is that emphasis on health
impacts likely to be felt by a large portion of the world's population
may be more persuasive than primarily pointing toward individual
nations with relatively small populations that will be utterly
devastated.
B. Sectoral Approaches to Mitigation with Co-Benefits for Health
In addition to providing a more compelling justification for climate
change mitigation, health concerns might shape the contours of the
mitigation regime at the international level, as well as national level
implementation of international obligations. Health advocates should
pay particular attention to the incorporation of land use regulation into
climate change mitigation strategies. Worldwide, poor land use
management, particularly deforestation, accounts for a greater share
of GHG emissions than either the transportation or industrial
sectors-more than twenty percent of total emissions. 133 Creation and
maintenance of biological sinks for carbon is a difficult area to
regulate due to monitoring and measurement challenges, but it has
important co-benefits for health, as well as for biodiversity and
130 See, e.g., IPCC, IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 3, at

688-716 (ch. 16).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See D. Schoene & M. Netto, The Kyoto Protocol: What Does it Mean for Forests
and Forestry?, 56 UNASYLVA 3 (2005).

.2009]

Healthy Planet, Healthy People

support of sustainable livelihoods. 34 Reforestation and avoided
deforestation have gained ground in UNFCCC negotiations and may
play a significant role in the post-2012 mitigation regime, primarily
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 135 Promotion of
sustainable agricultural practices -to reduce emissions and increase
.sinks has not played a major role in international climate governance,
but could still be an important part of national level strategies to meet
Of course, the
targets imposed by Kyoto and its successor.
incorporation of land use, forest-based, and agricultural mitigation
approaches into the post-Kyoto regime should be undertaken in such
a way that it will supplement, rather than supplant, emissions
reductions from more traditional sources in the industrialized world.
Transport, 136 industrial, 137 and energy 138 sector emissions also have
more direct, local impacts on health in addition to their impact
Most experts agree, moreover, that
through climate change.
mitigation from all sectors and in both industrialized and developing
change
nations will be necessary to hold the extent and rate of climate
39
adaptation.'
successful
for
allow
that
boundaries
within
Proponents of forest-based mitigation approaches see reforestation,
whereby "a project developer plants trees to reforest a degraded
ecosystem,"'' 40 and avoided deforestation, whereby a project
134 Mohamed T. E1-Ashry, An Overview of this Issue: Frameworkfor a Post-Kyoto
Climate Change Agreement, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y, Winter 2008, at 2, 3.
135 Takacs, supra note 89, at 57-58 (noting that "[c]urrent Kyoto Protocol rules allow
only [one] percent of carbon credits under the CDM to be allotted for projects in Land
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF)" and that avoided deforestation projects
"are currently excluded from CDM eligibility, but it is expected they will be a part of the
successor to the Kyoto Protocol").
136 The transportation sector's current reliance on fossil fuels plays a major role in
ground-level ozone and particulate matter air pollution with its resulting impacts on
cardiovascular and respiratory health. See, e.g., AM. PUB. HEALTH AWS'N, CLIMATE
CHANGE IS A PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUE (2008), available at http://www.nphw.org/nphw08/
NPHW%202008%20Blueprint.pdf. A shift to greater use of public transportation and
nonmotorized transport has significant co-benefits for health in terms of reduction in
obesity and cardiovascular disease and improved mental health. Id.
137 Industrial emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs have impacts on air, soil,
and water pollution with resulting impacts on health. See supra Part II.
138 The energy sector's current reliance on coal-fired power plants has significant
impacts on air pollution, as well as soil and water pollution, with resulting health impacts.
See generally Frederica Perera et al., Benefits of Reducing PrenatalExposure to CoalBurning Pollutants to Children's Neurodevelopment in China, 116 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1396 (2008).
139 IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27, at 542-84 (ch. 9).
140 Takacs, supra note 89, at 56.
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developer "ensures that a forest that would have otherwise been
degraded or felled is, instead, preserved,"' 14 1 as opportunities to
mitigate climate change by reducing emissions and increasing sinks,
while at the same time building ecological and social resilience to the
impacts of climate change. Forests perform a wide range of
ecological services that will be in ever greater demand in the face of
global climate change: stabilization of local climate fluctuations,
drought prevention, aquifer protection, preservation of pollinator
populations, soil stabilization, and buffering from storms and
floods. 142 Deforestation has a major impact on the health of local
populations in addition
to its indirect impact on global health through
43
climate change. 1
Some have expressed concerns, however, that Forest Carbon Offset
(FCO) projects, if not carefully governed, could be manipulated to
allow pri('ate industry to profit from projects that it would have
undertaken anyway, even in the absence of a carbon trading
mechanism that takes them into account. 144 Such manipulation could
be accomplished by using the extra carbon credits generated to allow
145
emissions from industrialized nations to continue unabated.
Incorporation of FCO projects into the Kyoto Protocol was
intentionally circumscribed based on concerns that experts have
classified into four main categories: leakage, permanence,
additionality, and quantifiability. 146 Leakage refers to the concern
that stakeholders who formerly relied on felling trees in a forest that
becomes protected will simply move their operations elsewhere. For
example, "a government may preserve one forest from planned
141 Id. at 56-57.
142 Id. at 57 (citing VALERIE KAPOS ET AL., UNEP, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM
DEFORESTATION: A KEY OPPORTUNITY FOR ATTAINING MULTIPLE BENEFITS 9-10

(2007), available at http://www.unep-wcmc.org/resources/publications/unepwcmc
%20RED%2OFebO7.pdf; Stefano Pagiola et al., Making Market-Based Mechanisms Work
for Forests and People, in SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: MARKETBASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 261 (Stefano Pagiola et al.

eds., 2002); David Freestone, Forewordto CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, at ix (Charlotte Streck et al. eds., 2008).
143 See, e.g., Yaw A. Afrane et al.,
Deforestation and Vectorial Capacity of Anopheles
Gambiae Giles Mosquitoes in Malaria Transmission, Kenya 14 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1533 (2008).
144 See Takacs, supra note 89, at 58-59.
145 See id.
146 See Imke Sagemiiller, Forest Sinks Under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: Opportunity or Risk for
Biodiversity, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 189, 195-96 (2006).
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logging and instead offer timber concessions elsewhere [or] logging
companies denied concession rights in one country may instead cut
timber in a neighboring country."' 147 Permanence refers to the
concern that carbon sinks may be destroyed in the future as forests
bum or are eventually encroached upon by other land uses, resulting
14 8
in an eventual increase in emissions that offsets the temporary sink.
Additionality refers to the concern that some FCO projects would
have been undertaken even in the absence of a carbon credit, based
purely on profit motive. The result is a net increase in emissions as
carbon credits awarded to projects that would have been undertaken
149
anyway are used to avoid emission reductions in other sectors.
Finally, quantifiability refers to problems of measurement,
monitoring, reporting, and verification associated with "calculating
present and future carbon stored in forests, particularly under different
climate change scenarios,"15 as well as the difficulties of regulating a
system that is more irregular in terms of its inputs and outputs than
the transportation, energy, and industry sectors.
This is obviously an area where there is a significant threat that
potential benefits may not be realized if the regulatory mechanism
does not adequately take these special considerations into account.
Incorporation of FCOs into the UNFCCC mitigation regime in the
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD)
program was an important focus of the Copenhagen COP and the
147 Takacs, supra note 89, at 58 (citing Johannes Ebeling, Risks and Criticisms of
Forestry-Based Climate Change Mitigation and Carbon Trading, in CLIMATE CHANGE
AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 142, at 43,
50-51); see also Philippe Cullet & Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Activities Implemented
Jointly in the Forestry Sector: Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, 10 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 111 (1997); Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 291, 296 (2004).
148 See Takacs, supra note 89, at 58 (citing PHILIPPE CULLET, DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 124 (2007)); Sagemuiller, supra
note 146, at 195; KAPOS ETAL., supra note 142, at 9-10.
149 See Takacs supra note 89, at 58 (citing Revkin, supra note 115, at Al); Marisa
Meizlish & David Brand, Developing Forestry Carbon Projectsfor the Voluntary Carbon
Market: A PracticalAnalysis, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY
AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 142, at 311, 317; Sebastian M. Scholz &
Martina Jung, Forestry Projects Under the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint
Implementation: Rules and Regulations, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING
POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 142, at 71, 76-77.
150Takacs, supra note 89, at 58 (citing Bryan Walsh, Getting Creditfor Saving Trees,
TIME, July 12, 2007, at 58); see also Kevin A. Baumert, Note, Participationof Developing
Countries in the International Climate Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 365, 381 (2006).
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negotiations leading up to it. The Copenhagen Accord includes a
paragraph on REDD 151 and an incomplete draft decision on the issue
was also developed at the COP. 15 2 Given that this is a hotly contested
issue among the environmental policy community, health
policymakers have an opportunity to highlight the co-benefits for
health of reforestation, and especially avoided deforestation, as a
consideration that might tip the scale in favor of investing the
considerable resources that will be required, to regulate this area
adequately if it is to be included in the mitigation regime.
Agricultural practices also play an important role in determining
GHG emissions and carbon sinks. Agriculture accounts for roughly
153
ten to twelve percent of global anthropogenic GHG emissions.
The link to deforestation, much of which is prompted by agricultural
expansion, is also important for global emissions. 154 Production and
use of nitrogen-based fertilizers, use of fossil fuels for agricultural
production, animal waste management, and livestock enteric
fermentation are all important sources of GHG emissions, which can
be reduced by improvements in management practices. 155 At the
same time, sustainable agricultural practices such as conservation
tillage, cover cropping, and crop rotation practices can increase
carbon sinks. 56 The IPCC has estimated that there is potential for
mitigation in the agricultural sector of the equivalent of 5.5-6
gigatons of carbon dioxide per year by 2030.157 For reference, total
global emissions in 2000 were equivalent to forty-three gigatons of
carbon dioxide. 158 The vast majority of this potential is in soil carbon
151 See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 8,
6 ("We recognize the crucial role of
reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance
removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive
incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including
REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.").
152 U.N. Climate Change Conference COP 15, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-15, 2009,
Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action
Under the Convention, FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.6 (Dec. 19, 2009).
153 IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27, at 499 (ch. 8).
154 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ENABLING AGRICULTURE TO
CONTRIBUTE TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 2 (2009) [hereinafter FAO], availableat

http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/igo/036.pdf.
155 See id. at 3; see also Gowri Koneswaran & Danielle Nierenberg, Global Farm
Animal Productionand Global Warming: Impacting and Mitigating Climate Change, 116
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 578, 578 (2008).
156 FAO, supra note 154.
157 IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27, at 500 (ch. 8).

158 Id. at 9 (summary for policymakers).
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sequestration, which is the use of sustainable agricultural practices
such as conservation tillage, cover cropping, and crop rotation to
increase carbon sinks by increasing the amount of carbon sequestered
in soil. 159 Reduction in methane emissions through improved
management of livestock and rice farming practices, as well as
reduction in nitrogen emissions through cropland management
160
practices, round out the remaining potential for mitigation.
The huge potential for agricultural mitigation is made even more
attractive by the fact that it is a relatively low-cost approach. Many
abatement options are cost neutral or even net profit positive and
require relatively low capital investment, in part because the required
technology is already well developed. 16
If agriculture industry
players are allowed to trade the carbon credits they generate through
low-cost interventions with players in other industries where
mitigation is more costly, then the result will actually be profit for the
agriculture industry. Thus, the incorporation of the agricultural sector
into a GHG trading mechanism has the potential to subsidize, rather
than impede, sustainable agricultural development, which in turn has
significant benefits not only for climate change adaptation, but for
meeting routine needs in the short term as well. Seventy-five percent
of the world's poor live in rural areas in developing countries, and
agriculture is the primary sector of the economy in most developing
countries. 162 In addition to contributing to food security, sustainable
agricultural development can promote poverty reduction in
surrounding communities while preserving the resilience of agro63
ecosystems. 1

Despite these potential benefits, however, agricultural mitigation is
even less far along in its incorporation into international climate
governance than forest-based mitigation. Agriculture-based carbon
sinks through soil carbon sequestration are not currently eligible for
159 The same practices that improve soil quality with decreased use of fertilizers can
also increase the amount of carbon sequestered in soil. See Perry Miller et al., Soil Carbon
Sequestration in Agriculture: Farm Management Practices Can Affect Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, MONTGUIDE, Apr. 2004, available at http://msuextension.org/publications/
AgandNaturalResources/MT200404AG.pdf.
160 FAO, supra note 154, at 1.
161 Id. at 1-2 (citing IPCC, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 27);
MCKINSEY & COMPANY, PATHWAYS TO A LoW-CARBON ECONOMY: VERSION 2 OF THE
GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT COST CURVE (2009).

162 FAO, supra note 154, at 2.
163 Id. at 1-2.

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 24, 203

64
CDM project status absent a very narrow research-based exception,'
and the CDM itself makes up a relatively small part of the mitigation
regime. Agricultural sequestration poses the same difficulties of
permanence, leakage, additionality, and quantifiability 165 that the
forestry and land use sector presents. 166 However, according to the
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the technology for
measuring soil carbon sequestration is perhaps farther along than
policymakers realize. 67 Furthermore, FAO notes that leakage is less
likely to be a concern in the agricultural sector than in the forestry
sector due to the likelihood that incorporation of agricultural
mitigation operations is likely to be maintained and may even expand,
rather than decrease, agricultural production. 168 Permanence, on the
other hand, may be a greater concern in the agricultural sector than in
the forestry sector, given that sustainable agricultural practices would
need to be continued year 1after
year to preserve the sequestration of
69
biomass.
and
soil
in
carbon
The greatest barrier to enabling agricultural mitigation approaches
is not technology or cost to the agricultural sector, but rather the lack
of financial and regulatory mechanisms that can accommodate the
attributes that set the agricultural sector-apart from other regulated
sectors like transportation, energy, and industry. In addition to the
concerns discussed above, the agricultural sector is also a difficult
area for climate change mitigation because of the "sheer size of land
areas under agriculture around the world (but at the same time this
breadth of opportunity, which exceeds that of forestry, is part of its
potential)[,] the variation in agroecosystems and farming systems,
' 70
[and] the large numbers of farmers that would need to be involved.'
Unlike the forestry and land use sectors, incorporating agricultural
sector mitigation opportunities into the international framework is far
more complicated than simply scaling up the CDM. "Not only are
many sources of agricultural mitigation not allowed under CDM, but
its project-based and offsets approach does not generate the breadth

164

Id.

165 See Sagemiller, supranote 146.
166 Id.
167 FAO, supra note 154, at 3.
168

Id.at 5.

Id.
170 Id.at 2.
169
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and scale of incentives that are needed."'' Whereas mitigation in the
forestry sector requires only that investors preserve forests or reforest
degraded land, "[c]apturing the full potential of agricultural
mitigation and its co-benefits requires widespread changes in
agricultural production systems, which in turn requires changes in
policy, institutions and technologies and a much broader approach by
mitigation financing mechanisms."1 72 In particular, innovative policy
and financing solutions must: provide equal opportunities for both
small-scale land holders and large-scale land owners; provide equal
opportunities for rights to emissions; allow for effective incentivizing
and enjoyment of co-benefits; allow tradable rights to emissions
reductions to be held by land users, based on traditional as well as
formal systems of property rights; make options for emissions
crediting and trading flexible enough to allow for the diversity of
mitigation approaches that might be appropriate in a particular local
context; and ensure that expanded agricultural development that takes
advantage of emissions trading opportunities 73 conforms with
international law for the protection of biodiversity.1
Perhaps the most important policy decision that would allow land
use management and agricultural practices to play a major role in
climate change mitigation with co-benefits for health is to what extent
and in what ways developing countries are included in the post-Kyoto
mitigation regime. This is indeed a key debate for determining the
future of the successor mitigation regime, and was in many ways
crucial to the downfall of the Kyoto Protocol. Much of the debate has
focused on the reluctance of fully industrialized countries like the
United States 174 and those in the European Union 175 to commit to
binding targets unless the rapidly industrializing nations like China
and India, important emerging competitors, are also bound. But there
is another consideration in favor of incorporating developing
countries, especially those that are rapidly industrializing, into the
successor mitigation regime.
The great majority of land use
emissions are in the developing world, and seventy percent of the
171 Id. at

5.

172 Id.
173 Id. at 6.

174 See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
175 Although the European Union did in fact ratify the Kyoto Protocol, it has not met its
targets under that agreement. See BALS, supra note 83. More recently, the European
Union has indicated a willingness to make more significant reductions, but only if other

major competitors do the same. See id.
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huge potential for mitigation in the agricultural sector, most of which
is based on increasing sinks, is in the developing world. 7 6 While
forest and agricultural emissions and sink reductions account for a
larger share of GHG concentrations than transportation and industrial
sectors when considered globally, in industrialized countries they are
far less significant. Some global health advocates, based on the
premise that higher per capita income due to economic development
is a critical determinant of health,' 7 7 may fear that emissions limits
will hinder development in the poorer countries of the world, and thus
be harmful to global health.178 However, it is important to understand
that the mitigation strategies that will be particularly crucial at the
national level if developing counties are included will have significant
co-benefits for the health of local populations. 179 A massive
expansion of the CDM might allow for better exploitation of
mitigation opportunities in the developing world without binding
developing countries to their own emissions reduction targets, though
it would not necessarily be enough to induce industrialized countries
to participate in a protocol that does not bind their rapidly
industrializing competitors.
C. The Importance of Public Health Infrastructureto Adaptation
Human civilization has always adapted to gradual climate change
via accommodation or migration, but what is unprecedented is the
rapidity with which we must now adapt to climate change that is
greatly accelerated by anthropogenic forcing. 80 What is new is "the
conscious, planned, anticipatory approach" that has been proposed by
the climate science and advocacy community. 18 1 One of the greatest
challenges to adaptation planning is that while there is nearly
universal scientific consensus about the fact that anthropogenically
forced climate change is occurring, and that it will have significant
176 FAO, supra note 154, at 1.
177 See, e.g., Lant Pritchett & Lawrence H. Summers, Wealthier is Healthier, 31 J.
HUMAN RESOURCES 841 (1996).
178 See, e.g., COMMISSION ON SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., CLOSING THE GAP IN A GENERATION: HEALTH EQUITY THROUGH ACTION ON THE

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH 66-68 (2008), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/
publications/2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf.
179 Id. at 60-62.
180 INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH WITH ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
LESSONS LEARNED AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 97, at xvii.
181 Id.
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impacts, the rate and degree of change and the severity of impacts is
still subject to a great deal of uncertainty, particularly at the local
level. The attempt to premeditate adaptation strategies, and thus
enhance our preparedness for the impacts of climate change, touches
on technological and policy advances addressing everything from
retreat of physical infrastructure projects away from coastlines and
building of structures to withstand more extreme. weather events to
developing agricultural technologies that can sustain food production
in the face of harsher environmental conditions. In the health sector,
adaptation to climate change is expected to require a variety of
changes to health systems. Both health care delivery systems and
public health infrastructure will come into play. Adaptation to
climate change is anticipated to require increased capacity to provide
access to adequate and affordable health care as well as capacity for
early warning systems, disease monitoring and surveillance, natural
disaster and public health emergency preparedness and response, and
public education interventions. 82 Additionally, provision for basic
survival needs, especially water and food systems management, will
be crucial to our capacity to respond to the impacts of climate change.
Particularly in the developing world, public health infrastructure and
national health law have a long way to go to rise to the challenges that
climate change is likely to pose.
In addition to creating novel threats to health and shifting the
geographic scope of existing threats, climate change will also act as
an intensifier, dramatically increasing the magnitude of preexisting
problems ranging from poverty, conflict, and hunger to infectious and
chronic disease burdens.1 83 Some health adaptation measures will
likely be aimed at confronting new risks posed by climate change, at
least at the local level, such as preparation for monitoring and control
of malaria-carrying mosquitoes at higher altitudes where populations
have not previously been exposed, or response to new diseases that
might emerge in the context of changed environmental conditions.
Most adaptations in the context of global health, however, are likely
to be "no-regrets strategies.'' 184 Improvements of public health
systems focusing on accessible basic health care facilities, clean water
and sanitation, and disease control programs may be motivated in part
182 Id. at xviii.
183 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
184 INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH WiTH ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE:
LESSONS LEARNED AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supranote 97, at xviii.
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by climate change concerns, but are likely to have significant benefits
regardless of whether climate, in fact, has the impact that scientists
anticipate. These strategies have the potential to enhance the ability
of public health systems to respond to the routine threats they already
face, even as those threats intensify.
The public health and global health communities have a long
history of managing new threats to population well-being. In many
ways, the health advocacy community is more experienced with the
type of questions presented by climate change adaptation than the
environmental advocacy community.
Whereas international
environmental governance has typically been concerned with regimes
that limit the actions of state, and consequently industrial players,
global health governance has been more focused on promotion of
health and well-being through affirmative duties.
Adaptation
necessarily builds more on the latter sort of inquiry, and thus is in
some ways far afield of the typical focus on environmental regulatory
bodies. Health advocates bring their experience in evaluating the
success and investigating the failure of various types of intervention,
as well as what they have learned through their experiments with a
variety of positive law and policy tools.
Although health advocates have been regrettably late to the climate
governance table, global health voices are increasingly speaking of
climate change as one of the most important threats to worldwide
human well-being. In a recent resolution, the World Health Assembly
committed to providing member states with support and advice
regarding health impacts of climate change and adaptation approaches
independently of the UNFCCC, and also to seeking a greater role
within the UNFCCC. 185 The UNFCCC Secretariat has been criticized
for not adequately "supporting processes outside of the Convention
1' 86
which have particular expertise in areas that are key to adaptation."
One issue among many under consideration by the UNFCCC Ad-hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and
the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) is whether a permanent
adaptation body or expert group should be established under the
UNFCCC. 87 An adaptation body or panel would create a procedural
185 Sixty-First World Health Assembly, supra note 11.
186 HARMELING, supra note 106, at 6.
187 Id at 42-44. Developing countries largely support the establishment of an
adaptation body, urging that it would allow for better integration of expertise specific to
the varied areas touched on by adaptation policy. Id. Several industrialized countries have
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opportunity for health experts, among. others, to play a more active
role in climate adaptation governance.
Another issue under debate in the UNFCCC AWG-LCA that has
implications for global health policy is whether adaptation assistance
from wealthy to developing countries should be mainstreamed with
Official Development Assistance (ODA). Developed nations have
increasingly called for the integration of adaptation into general
188
development policy and planning as a precondition for funding.
Integration of policy is not particularly controversial, and most agree
that it is in fact crucial to the development of coherent adaptation
strategies at the national level.
Adaptation is not simply a matter of designing projects or putting
together lists of measures to reduce the impacts of climate change.
A national policy response would increase resilience to climate
vulnerability and change and should be anchored in a country's
framework for economic growth and sustainable
development and
189
integrated in its poverty reduction strategies.
The controversy arises because developing nations have perceived
this call for mainstreaming as an indication that developed countries
will shirk their responsibility for compensating developing countries
for the impacts of anthropogenically forced climate change. The
majority of developed countries have indeed argued that "[blecause
the costs of adaptation . . . provide largely local benefits, [are]
difficult to distinguish from 'regular' development, [are] suspected to
90
be large, and smacked of compensation awarded for damages,"'
substantial funding should not be allocated for adaptation. Instead,
they suggested that ODA will play an important role in financing
adaptation measures. Given that most countries already fall far short
of meeting their ODA commitments, 19 1 developing countries insist
that "adaptation is not funded as general [ODA], but as a kind of

expressed opposition to the idea, noting that there are ways to make use of existing bodies
outside of the UNFCCC rather than taking on the expense of creating a new adaptation
body. Id.
188 Id. at 21-22.
189 EI-Ashry, supra note 134, at 3-4.

190 Id. at 4.
191 See, e.g., ONE, THE DATA REPORT 2009: MONITORING THE G8 PROMISE TO

AFRICA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,
datareport2009/downloads.html.

available at

http://www.one.org/internationaU/
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compensation for extra costs that are imposed on them by those'1 92
who
contribute the most to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions."
The debate highlights that what may seem on the surface to be a
win-win or no regrets situation, where funds invested for climate
change adaptation also have multiple co-benefits and are thus more
cost effective, may belie an attempt to shift funds from ODA to
climate change adaptation without actually increasing assistance
overall. Fundamental principles of international environmental law
support adaptation-only funding as opposed to ODA mainstreaming.
Both the "polluter pays" principle established in the Rio
Declaration 93 and the "common but differentiated responsibility"
19 4
principle, which forms the legal foundation of the UNFCCC,
support exactly the compensatory character of adaptation funding to
which developed countries have objected. Furthermore, given that
ODA already falls far short of what is needed in the developing
world, the innovative financing structure of the Adaptation Fund is a
promising development. 195 Global health advocates should promote
the integration of climate adaptation considerations into development
plans, but should also advocate strongly for building upon the
Adaptation Fund's financing mechanism to allow for significantly
higher funding, rather than mainstreaming of adaptation funding into
ODA.
"Public health prevention and climate change adaptation share the
goal of increasing the ability of nations, communities, and individuals
to effectively and efficiently cope with challenges and changes.
192 HARMELING, supra note 106, at 22.
193 U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26
(Aug. 12, 1992) ("National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution ....").See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols,31 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
54 (2007) (describing GHG pollution as a kind of tort, where polluters who have gained
economically from their pollution ought to pay for the damage they have caused).
194 UNFCCC, supra note 70, at hrt. 3 ("The [p]arties should protect the climate system
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country [p]arties should take the lead in
combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.").
195 Cf Anthony Clunies-Ross, Development Finance: Beyond Budgetary "Official
Development Assistance, " 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 389, 393 (2004) (stating that financing
approaches that go beyond official development assistance, including internationally
coordinated levies, are necessary to provide sufficient funding for development).
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96
Indeed, that is what is meant by adaptation to an external stress."',
Emphasis on climate change as a fundamental transformation of our
environment with important consequences for health has the potential
to motivate the additional political will needed to improve global
health infrastructure in ways that will make health systems more
resilient in the face of climate change while also building capacity to
handle more routine needs. Many potential climate change adaptation
projects, such as the development of better disease surveillance and
response capacity, improvements in sanitation and protection of food
and water security, and the strengthening of natural disaster
preparedness and response capabilities, look a lot like traditional
international health initiatives.
Rights and responsibilities with respect to adaptation, currently
being negotiated under the auspices of the UNFCCC, have the
potential to create new opportunities to focus on the basic survival
needs of the world's least healthy people' 97 in ways that previous
efforts at international cooperation with respect to health have not.
This is due to a basic difference between the motivation for traditional
means of international cooperation with respect to health and the
motivation driving cooperation on adaptation. The recently revised
International Health Regulations, for example, establish obligations
for international cooperation that are largely driven by the threat of
transboundary spread of disease. 198 Some critics have suggested that
the history of these regulations indicates that they are ultimately
motivated by the threat of spread from the developing world to the
industrialized world.1 99 Focus on self-interest as a motivation for
wealthy countries' willingness to cooperate on global health

196 Gary Yohe & Kristie L. Ebi, Approaching Adaptation: Parallels and Contrasts
Between the Climate and Health Communities, in INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH WITH
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: LESSONS LEARNED AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra

note 97, at 18, 18.
197 Cf SVEN HARMELING ET AL., MAKING THE ADAPTATION FUND WORK FOR THE
MOST VULNERABLE PEOPLE (2008) available at http://www.germanwatch.org/
klima/adfund08.pdf.
198 See David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health
Security: The New InternationalHealth Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 325, 336

(2005).
199 See id.; see also Oyewale Tomori, Presentation prepared for the Forum on Microbial
Threats Public Workshop: IHR and Movement of Pathogens in a Globalized World (Dec.
16-17,
2008),
http://veterans.iom.edu/-/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/
MicrobialThreats/Tomori.ashx (addressing perception of the motivation behind the IHR as
an obstacle to implementation in developing countries).
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initiatives necessarily plays a role in dictating the priorities that will
be addressed by that cooperation. This emphasis leads, for example,
to prioritization of emerging diseases that have the potential for rapid
spread over reducing more burdensome impacts from relatively easily
addressed threats such as parasitic or diarrheal illness. 200 The health
impacts of climate change are, for the most part, not the sort of threats
that are likely to move rapidly from the developing world to the
industrialized world. It is certainly possible that changed climate
conditions could foster the emergence of new viruses with the
potential for global spread. It is more likely, however, that most
threats, including the intensification of diarrheal illness, the gradual
latitudinal and altitudinal spread of vector-borne illness, greater
intensity of natural disasters, and the effects of insecurity and water
stress more generally, will not be of the sort that prompt selfinterested action by wealthy countries to build improved health
infrastructure in the developing world. The adaptation regime
currently under negotiation, however, is not prompted by the
transboundary nature of the impacts of climate change as much as it is
by the transboundary nature of the causes. This might mean that
adaptation cooperation faces an uphill battle. But, if it is successful,
both the tie. between adaptation cooperation for the benefit of
developing countries and the willingness of developing countries to
participate in a mitigation regime might be the crucial key to that
success, then it will allow for international cooperation on health
threats that have previously been neglected.
IV
MOVING THE DEBATE FORWARD

As the focus of the UNFCCC has broadened to include greater
consideration of adaptation to the impacts of climate change,
communities beyond the traditional boundaries of environmental
regulatory policymaking have begun to realize the extent to which
their interests are implicated by the international response to climate
change. Indeed, adaptation requires a very different set of law,
policy, and governance tools than environmental policymakers have
200 See, e.g., Peter J. Hotez et al., Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, 357 NEW

ENG. J.MED. 1018, 1018-19 (2007) (comparing the impacts of neglected tropical diseases,
most of which are preventable through environmental health interventions such as clean
water and sanitation, with those of emerging acute infections such as Ebola virus and avian
influenza).
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traditionally employed in their mitigation efforts,20 ' and it may be that
policymakers from other sectors, including global health, are better
suited to the effort. In recent years, the UNFCCC has shown a greater
willingness to reach out to the health, agricultural, and land use
sectors for expertise and policymaking guidance on mitigation policy
as well as adaptation. The challenges posed by such an allencompassing scope for international cooperation are indeed
considerable, but so are the opportunities. Consideration of the cobenefits of particular mitigation opportunities, for health as well as for
sustainable development more generally, should play a crucial role in
weighing the various policy options currently under consideration.
By prompting a recalculation of the costs and benefits, bringing these
broader considerations into account may serve to move the debate
forward in a way that increases the likelihood that the international
community will take meaningful action on climate change as the
international community continues to negotiate and implement a
post-2012 climate agreement

201 Cf Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood, EnvironmentalLaw for Sustainability,
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 1, 2 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan
Wood eds., 2006) (discussing the command and control approach traditionally applied to
environmental problems).

